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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
and Jennifer A. Blackburn"
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Even in tough economic times, the work of administrative agencies
seems to continue with particularly robust growth at the state level.
The number of contested agency cases seems to be rising, even those
involving the most trivial details. Although the idea of more government
is not fashionable in most corridors, higher levels of activity by existing
governmental agencies will be the norm until the state's economic
picture achieves measurable improvement.
This Article is a survey of cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2009 through May 31, 2010.1
The cases chosen for review were prioritized by a concentration of
administrative law principles in the opinions. One will be able to find
specialized subject matters-some including administrative law
principles-in other articles of this volume.
This Article begins with cases under Georgia's "any evidence" rule'
and then shifts to agency defenses. Next, cases highlighting judicial
review and other standards of review for agency cases are addressed.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., with honors, 1978).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.A., 2000); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2004).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The Authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Troutman Sanders summer
associate Courtney Ferrell in the preparation of this Article.
1. For analysis of Georgia administrative law during the prior survey period, see
Martin M. Wilson & Jennifer A. Blackburn, AdministrativeLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2009).
2. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2009); see, e.g., Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Holland, 133 Ga.
App. 616, 617, 211 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1974).
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The last section of the Article is an enumeration of legislation adding,
subtracting, multiplying, and dividing administrative agencies as passed
during the 2010 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly.
IL.

THE "ANY EVIDENCE" RULE

The Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia v. Hogan' is a good example of how not to
follow the any evidence rule. Hogan was the registrar at one of the
universities governed by the Board of Regents of the University System
of Georgia (Board). She was fired by the president of the university and
appealed to an administrative law judge (AU). Upon a failure to obtain
relief, Hogan sought review by the Board, which promptly adopted the
decision of the AIA. Hogan then appealed by means of a writ of
certiorari in the superior court, which overturned the prior adverse
decisions. In addition, the superior court awarded damages and attorney
fees to Hogan as a part of the decision. The Board filed a successful
application for discretionary review in the court of appeals."
Citing a failure to observe the any evidence rule, the court of appeals
agreed with the Board and reversed the superior court's decision.' The
ALJ, with whom the Board had agreed, found Hogan to be an at-will
employee and subject to discharge unless the action was "arbitrary and
capricious." Because the facts showed the university president had not
acted in such a manner, the AIJ upheld the termination. However,
instead of relying upon the evidence produced by the AIA, the superior
court made independent findings of fact and overturned Hogan's
termination.6 Consequently, because the superior court erroneously
substituted its judgment for the AIU's, the court of appeals reversed the
decision.'
Hogan had also asserted a due process claim, alleging that she had
been given no reason for her termination and did not have an initial
grievance hearing.' The court of appeals was not impressed, however,
because a full hearing had been convened before the ALP.

3. 298 Ga. App. 454, 680 S.E.2d 518 (2009).
4. Id. at 454, 680 S.E.2d at 520.
5. Id. at 454, 457-58, 680 S.E.2d at 520, 522 (quoting Prof1 Standards Comm'n v.
Smith, 257 Ga. App. 418, 418, 571 S.E.2d 443, 444 (2002)).
6. Id. at 456, 680 S.E.2d at 521.
7. Id. at 457-58, 680 S.E.2d at 522.
8. Id at 457, 680 S.E.2d at 521.
9. Id. at 457, 680 S.E.2d at 522.
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In GeorgiaReal EstateAppraisers Board v. Krouse,o another reversal
by the court of appeals, the any evidence rule played an important part.
Krouse had a license as a real estate appraiser. He assigned a value of
$113,000 to a parcel of property, although he knew that the market
value was around $20,000-$25,000. The property was immediately
donated to charity, which Krouse knew would happen, and the donor
took a $113,000 charitable deduction on the donor's next filed federal tax
return. As soon as the donation had been made, Krouse's wife bought
the property for $25,000. In about two years, she sold the property to
the Georgia Department of Transportation for over $250,000. When the
local newspaper later reviewed the transactions by Mr. and Mrs. Krouse,
the Georgia Real Estate Appraisers Board (Board) investigated. The
Board initiated disciplinary proceedings to revoke Krouse's license, and
a hearing was held before an AL. The ALJ recommended revocation,
which was confirmed by the Board's final review."
Krouse appealed to the superior court, which reversed the Board on
multiple issues. First, the superior court decided that the Board should
have required expert testimony to establish Krouse's violations.12 The
court of appeals disagreed and articulated the issue as "whether the
violations for which Krouse was charged are of a complicated nature so
as to require highly specialized knowledge and explanation by an expert
to understand the parameters of acceptable conduct." 3 The court held
that Krouse's behavior and the sheer number and type of charged
violations obviated any need for an expert because violations were
clearly shown.'
Alternatively, the Board also relied upon the position that the superior
court had ignored the any evidence rule in making its determinations.'
The court of appeals found multiple instances of evidence in the record
to support the revocation and agreed that error had been committed.16
Because the superior court failed to apply the any evidence rule when
evidence existed to support the revocation of Krouse's license, the court
of appeals reversed the ruling of the superior court.' 7
Yet another reversal of a superior court judgment, the case of Davane
v. Thurmond"a revolved around the payment of unemployment benefits.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

299 Ga. App. 73, 681 S.E.2d 737 (2009).
Id. at 73-76, 681 S.E.2d at 738-40.
Id. at 76, 681 S.E.2d at 740-41.
Id. at 76-77, 681 S.E.2d at 740-41.
Id. at 78-79, 681 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 79, 681 S.E.2d at 743.
Id. at 79-82, 681 S.E.2d at 743-45.
Id. at 82, 681 S.E.2d at 745.
300 Ga. App. 474, 685 S.E.2d 446 (2009).
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In 2007 Davane was employed by a software company in a position that
required a lot of travel. Shortly after getting the job, she had to stop the
out-of-town work because of problems with child care. The employer
gave her a temporary assignment that allowed her to work from home,
but the employer inquired about her return to her original position a few
months later. In 2008 when a new out-of-town project came up, Davane
was assigned to the job, but she could not arrange for child care. The
employer said that he had given roughly two-weeks' notice of the
assignment, but Davane testified that the employer gave only two-days'
notice. Since Davane could not arrange for child care, she was
discharged from her position. Upon application for unemployment
benefits, Davane was turned down. The Board of Review (Board) for the
Georgia Department of Labor disqualified Davane from unemployment
compensation on the basis that she should have procured child care and
was at fault for not doing so.' 9 The superior court affirmed the Board's
findings, which included a finding that there was evidence to support the
Board's decision, and Davane appealed.'
The court of appeals reversed, using an analysis that basically
incorporated the any evidence rule."' The evidence before the Board
concerning Davane's time to respond to the out-of-town assignment was
conflicting.22 However, the court of appeals held that the employer's
testimony that Davane was notified two weeks before the out-of-town
assignment was based on information provided to the employer by a
third party and therefore constituted hearsay.' The hearsay evidence
was neither competent nor probative to support a finding that Davane
Accordingly,
had been given ample notice to secure child care.'
Davane was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits
because the only competent evidence showed that she had been given
only two- or three-days' notice." She was not intentionally failing to
comply with the directions of the employer because she could not have
been reasonably expected to procure child care in such a short period of
time 2
A case was reversed for the fourth time in 'rawick Construction Co.
v. Georgia Department of Revenue," this time by the supreme court.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 474-75, 685 S.E.2d at 447-48.
Id. at 474, 685 S.E.2d at 447.
Id. at 476, 685 S.E.2d at 448-49.
Id. at 475-76, 685 S.E.2d at 448.
Id. at 476, 685 S.E.2d at 448.
Id.
Id. at 476-78, 685 S.E.2d at 448-50.
Id. at 477-78, 685 S.E.2d at 449-50.
286 Ga. 597, 690 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
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In Tawick the court decided that a federal income tax election of tax
treatment made by a corporation does not apply to a state income tax
election in the same situation.' Trawick was an out-of-state Subchapter S corporation for federal tax purposes, meaning that its shareholders
directly reported their individual portions of the business's income on
their own personal tax returns. However, in Georgia, Trawick was a
Subchapter C corporation, meaning the business entity paid taxes to the
state for its in-state business income." The stockholders of Trawick
sold all of the corporate shares and made an election under the Internal
Revenue Code' for the sale to be viewed by taxing entities as a sale of
the corporation's assets. On Trawick's federal and state returns, the
proportional amount from the sale for Georgia taxes was $47,980. The
Georgia Department of Revenue (GDR) viewed the transaction as being
apportioned differently and assessed $224,820 of additional taxes.31
Trawick appealed to an ALJ, who decided that the $224,820 should
not be paid. When the case was presented for a final decision to the
Georgia Revenue Commissioner (Commissioner), the Commissioner
reversed the ALJ. Trawick then appealed to the superior court, which
reversed the Commissioner, leading to an appeal by the GDR to the
court of appeals.' As described in last year's survey article,' the
court of appeals reversed the superior court.' Trawick then obtained
a writ of certiorari and eventually received finality in the form of an
order from the supreme court.'
This is not so much an any evidence case as it is a case in which the
conclusions drawn from the evidence differed according to the decision
maker. The question was whether shareholders of Trawick, classified as
a Subchapter S corporation, could make the election regarding the
treatment of the transaction and its tax consequences or whether the
corporate entity was entrusted with the choice." Stating that the court
of appeals relied on irrelevant evidence to conclude that the corporate
entity had participated in the election, the supreme court held that
under section 48-7-21(b)(7) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 597, 600-01, 690 S.E.2d at 602, 604.
Id. at 597, 690 S.E.2d at 601-02.
Title 26 of the United States Code.
Trawick, 286 Ga. at 597, 690 S.E.2d at 602.
Id.
Wilson & Blackburn, supra note 1, at 10.
Trawick, 286 Ga. at 597, 690 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 597, 601, 690 S.E.2d at 602, 604.
Id. at 597-98, 690 S.E.2d at 602.
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(O.C.G.A.), 37 the taxpayer shareholders had the authority to direct
which election would be made.m
The last decision reviewed in this section completes the string of

reversals. In Neal v. Augusta-Richmond County Personnel Board,39 a
firefighter received a random drug test as part of the substance abuse
policy carried out by the Augusta-Richmond County Personnel Board
(Board). The urine specimen was sent to an independent laboratory, and
the resulting lab report showed that Neal tested positive for marijuana.
When the result was returned to a medical review officer, the report was
forwarded to the county risk manager, who in turn informed the fire
chief of the test result. The fire chief then placed Neal on administrative
leave and recommended his termination.'
Neal exercised his right to appeal and obtained an administrative
hearing. The lab report and testimony from the medical review officer
were admitted into evidence at the hearing over Neal's objections, which
were on the grounds of hearsay and the right to confront witnesses.
Following the hearing, an order was entered by the Board upholding the
recommendation to terminate Neal. Neal then filed for a writ of
certiorari to the superior court, but it was denied."' In turn, an
application for discretionary appeal was filed and subsequently granted
by the court of appeals.'
Neal argued that he had been denied his constitutional right to
confront adverse witnesses because no one from the testing laboratory
showed up at the hearing, yet the adverse lab report had been entered
into evidence. Because the lab report did not constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule, Neal argued that the case should be reversed. The
court of appeals agreed." Additionally, even though the constitutional
right to confrontation of witnesses generally arises in the context of a
criminal case, Neal's property interest in his employment, coupled with
his right to due process, indicated that his case should be reversed for
a lack of evidence." The court of appeals stated that "the lab results
were hearsay. Hearsay is without probative value to establish any fact.
We have held that hearsay is not appropriate evidence even in an

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21(bX7) (2009 & Supp. 2010).
Trawick, 286 Ga. at 599, 690 S.E.2d at 603.
304 Ga. App. 115, 695 S.E.2d 318 (2010).
Id. at 115, 695 S.E.2d at 319-20.
Id. at 115, 695 S.E.2d at 320.
Id.
Id. at 116, 695 S.E.2d at 320.
Id.
Id. at 116, 118-19, 695 S.E.2d at 320, 322.

2010]1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

7

administrative proceeding."" Because the Board relied on the test
alone in deciding to terminate Neal's employment, the case was
reversed.47
III. AGENCY DEFENSES
This section highlights the novel defenses that agencies use to stand
their ground and defend unwarranted litigation. For example, in
Manlove v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County' the plaintiffs, college students living in Athens-Clarke County, challenged the
constitutionality of Athens-Clarke County Ordinance § 3-5-2449 by
seeking a declaratory judgment in superior court. The rather restrictive
enactment prohibited plainly audible sounds from a distance of 300 feet
during the day and from 100 feet late at night. Additionally, sounds
from inside a dwelling could not be plainly audible more than five feet
from the building's boundary. The plaintiffs had never been cited for a
violation of the ordinance, and none of the plaintiffs could show a
particularized harm or injury. Accordingly, the superior court dismissed
the action for lack of standing.'
Upon appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, the dismissal was
affirmed." The failure to show any adverse circumstance or injury
resulting from the ordinance meant the plaintiffs could not maintain the
action."
In Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus," the supreme court faced a
question that had been in controversy for a few years about the
imposition of the hotel-motel tax for transactions involving travel
companies. Expedia is a popular travel company that conducts business
via the internet. Expedia books and charges for rooms with contracted
hotels at discount rates. The amount charged is actually a combination
of the rate from the hotel plus fees from Expedia, although the company
does not disclose how the amounts are separated. The customer pays
nothing to the hotel after the stay, and the hotel bills Expedia for the
agreed-upon room rate and applicable taxes and fees."

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 118, 695 S.E.2d at 322.
Id at 118-19, 695 S.E.2d at 322.
285 Ga. 637, 680 S.E.2d 405 (2009).
ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY, GA., CODE § 3-5-24 (2010).
Manlove, 285 Ga. at 637-38, 680 S.E.2d at 405-06.
Id. at 638-39, 680 S.E.2d at 406.

52. Id.

53. 285 Ga. 684, 681 S.E.2d 122 (2009).
54. Id. at 684-85, 681 S.E.2d at 124-25.
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The City of Columbus (City) promulgated the Hotel-Motel Occupancy
Excise Tax Ordinance," levying a 7% hotel-motel tax on hotel
guests." The tax was supposed to be remitted by whoever collected it
from the person paying for the room." The City filed an extensive
complaint against Expedia, largely based upon Expedia's failure to remit
taxes for the whole amount charged to Expedia's customers instead of
only the taxes paid by Expedia on the rate negotiated with the hotel.
The trial court held that as long as Expedia failed to separate charges
and disclose the allocations to the public, Expedia should pay taxes on
the whole amount charged."
While this judgment was affirmed with direction by the supreme court,
from the standpoint of administrative law, the interesting piece of this
decision was Expedia's contention that "the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction due to the failure of the City to exhaust its administrative remedies." The contention centered on City Ordinance § 19117,' which required written notice to Expedia from the City of the
estimated tax Expedia was supposed to pay.e' The supreme court held
that Columbus had sent the assessment notice showing an amount owed
of $26,000.62 Expedia replied that the assessment was wrong and told
the City that Expedia was not subject to its ordinances or to the general
tax statute regarding the hotel-motel tax.' In summary fashion, the
supreme court held as follows: "Since neither the City's ordinance nor
the Enabling Statute provide any other process or procedure to review
the written assessment, the City has completed its administrative
process.'
In Goddard v. City of Albany," an employee termination was at
issue. Goddard had been the director of the civic center, but she was
terminated by the city manager for poor job performance. The city
manager set up a meeting with Goddard before taking final action and
allowed Goddard to bring an attorney and witnesses. However, the city

55. COLUMBUs, GA., CODE § 19-111 (2010).
56. Expedia, 285 Ga. at 685, 681 S.E.2d at 125. The City promulated the ordinance
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-13-51(a)(1XB)(i) (2009 & Supp. 2010), which is a section
contained in the statewide enabling statute. O.C.G.A. tit. 48, art. 3 (2009 & Supp. 2010).
57. Expedia, 285 Ga. at 685,681 S.E.2d at 125; see also O.C.G.A. § 48-13-51(aX1XB)(ii).
58. Expedia, 285 Ga. at 686, 681 S.E.2d at 125-26.
59. Id. at 687, 681 S.E.2d at 126.
60. COLUMBUS, GA., CODE § 19-117 (2010).
61. Espedia, 285 Ga. at 687, 681 S.E.2d at 126.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 687-88, 681 S.E.2d at 126.
65. 285 Ga. 882, 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009).
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manager went ahead with the final termination of employment after the
meeting. Goddard petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the superior court
on the grounds that her meeting with the city manager had been a
"quasi-judicial" hearing. The superior court determined it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for certiorari. It
also denied Goddard's claim for mandamus relief and other state law
claims. Accordingly, Goddard appealed to the supreme court."6
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on
every point of the appeal.6 7 Regarding the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court reviewed various city charter and personnel
ordinances.' The court held that there was no conferred right to a
hearing for someone at the department head level such as Goddard and
that the city manager did not act in a quasi-judicial role as that term is
used in the statutes.' Thus, the dismissal of the petition for a writ of
certiorari was proper."o Other arguments posed by Goddard, including
judicial estoppel, denial of equal protection, and various tort claims, were
also rejected."
R.AF v. Robinson 2 was a curious case in which an irate parent, who
was also a licensed attorney, filed a petition for mandamus to force the
Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning, the Georgia Department of Human Resources, and the DeKalb County Department of
Family and Children Services to investigate the Marcus Jewish
Community Center (Center) for child abuse and neglect. The basis of
the complaints was punishment levied by persons at the Center making
R.A.F., a minor child, remove soiled materials from a toilet after a
bathroom soiling accident. The agencies had investigated the matter
and found no evidence of abuse or neglect. The parent, undeterred, filed
a petition for writ of mandamus. The agencies moved to dismiss, only
to be met with a second amended petition seeking the relief stated
above.
After a hearing, the motion to dismiss was granted. Before the appeal
took place, the parent filed a motion for reconsideration coupled with an
application for certification of immediate review and a third amended
petition. The parent was granted leave to fie the instant appeal, but

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 882, 684 S.E.2d at 638.
Id.
Id. at 883-84, 684 S.E.2d at 639.
Id. at 884, 684 S.E.2d at 639; see also O.C.G.A.
Goddard,285 Ga. at 884, 684 S.E.2d at 639.
Id. at 884-87, 684 S.E.2d at 639-41.
286 Ga. 644, 690 S.E.2d 372 (2010).
Id. at 644-45 & n.1, 690 S.E.2d at 373 & n.1.

§ 5-4-1 (1995).
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the superior court subsequently entered a second order dismissing the
matter in its entirety.7 4
Of the multiple errors cited by the parent, the supreme court dealt
primarily with the dismissal of the petition for mandamus. 75 Because
the agencies had already looked into the matter and reached a determination, any direction from the supreme court seeking to have the
agencies fulfill their duties was moot.76 Additionally, mandamus would
not be proper to direct a discretionary act or somehow rectify a prior act
absent some clear mistake.
This survey period hopefully marked the end of multiple rounds of
appellate cases such as Hitch v. Vasarhelyi.7 ' This plethora of cases
arose because Hitch wanted to thwart his neighbor's plan to build a
dock.79 Among other things, Hitch wanted a declaratory judgment that
a hearing was available before an AIJ and mandamus requiring the
Georgia Department of Natural Resources to allow the AIJ to rule on
the dock permit application at that hearing.'
In reviewing the decision from the superior court's denial of relief to
Hitch, the court of appeals held that there was no basis for the right to
a hearing."' The two most prominent reasons the court of appeals
discussed that pertained to administrative law were (1) the lack of a
contested case and (2) the clear legislative intent that the hearing
process would not apply to private dock applications.'
The agency defense in Summerlin v. GeorgiaPines Community Service
Board' was based on a prior ruling that sovereign immunity of state
employees did not cover borrowed servants. Summerlin brought an
action against the Georgia Pines Community Service Board (Board) for
the wrongful death of her son, who had been a patient at Georgia Pines.
She alleged that two health care workers negligently caused her son's
death. However, those two workers were actually employees from an
outside staffing company.'

74. Id. at 645, 690 S.E.2d at 373.
75. Id. at 645-47, 690 S.E.2d at 373-74.
76. Id. at 646, 690 S.E.2d at 374.
77. Id. (quoting Bland Farms, LLC v. Ga. Dep't of Agric., 281 Ga. 192, 193, 637 S.E.2d
37, 39 (2006)).
78. 302 Ga. App. 381, 691 8.E.2d 286 (2010).
79. Id. at 381, 691 S.E.2d at 288.
80. Id. at 383, 691 S.E.2d at 289.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 383-84, 691 S.E.2d at 289-90. See generally O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-283(b), 295(7) (2006); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(2) (2009).
83. 286 Ga. 593, 690 S.E.2d 401 (2010).
84. Id. at 593, 690 S.E.2d at 401.
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The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Georgia Pines's
motion to dismiss and held that borrowed servants were not state
employees under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)" and that the
After examining the
waiver of immunity would thus not apply.'
GTCA, the supreme court noted that the GTCA provided a definition of
"state employee," but it only stated that such person had to be an
employee of the state."' The supreme court determined that the
legislature must have been aware that the term "employee" under both
common law and case law included borrowed servants." Accordingly,
the supreme court reversed and held that immunity would indeed be
waived.'
IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

In two cases decided within a day of each other, the court of appeals
reaffirmed the previously established two-step process forjudicial review
of an administrative decision. The first case, Lamar Co. v. Whiteway
Neon-Ad," illustrated the highly competitive market surrounding the
location of technologically advanced multiple-message signs along state
highways. In Lamar both parties owned signs located approximately
1200 feet apart along Interstate-85 in the City of Atlanta, and they had
both been issued outdoor advertising permits by the Georgia Department
of Transportation (GDOT). Subsequently, both parties applied for an
additional permit to display multiple messages on their respective
signs.91 Unfortunately for these two parties, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75(c)(1)(C)" requires multiple-message signs on the same side of the highway
to be at least 5000 feet apart." Accordingly, only one of the parties
could obtain a multiple-message permit.' The dispute between the two
companies arose from this determination."
In May 2005 the GDOT granted Whiteway's request to upgrade its
existing sign by installing an LED message center under the condition
that the sign would not change more than once every twenty-four hours.
In September 2006 Whiteway submitted another request to revise its

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

O.C.GA §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2009).
Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 593, 690 S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 593-94, 690 S.E.2d at 402; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(7).
Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 594, 690 S.E.2d at 402.
See id. at 596, 690 S.E.2d at 404.
303 Ga. App. 495, 693 S.E.2d 848 (2010).
Id. at 495, 693 S.E.2d at 849.
O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75(cX1XC) (2009).
Lamar,303 Ga. App. at 495,693 S.E.2d at 849; see also O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75(cX1)(C).
Lamar, 303 Ga. App. at 495, 693 S.E.2d at 849.
See id. at 496-97, 693 S.E.2d at 850.
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existing permit to a multiple-message permit. The GDOT granted the
request but required the upgrade to be completed within one year, or the
permit would revert back to the original sign configuration.9 Although
the sign was upgraded within the one-year period, it "continued to
change messages only once a day until approximately three weeks after
the expiration of the" one-year period.'
In October 2007 Lamar
applied for a multiple-message permit, which the GDOT denied because
the sign was located within 5000 feet of Whiteway's sign. On December
6, 2007, however, the GDOT informed Whiteway that its multiplemessage permit had been revoked because Whiteway had failed to
change the sign within the one-year period."
Both parties appealed the GDOTs decisions, and the consolidated
appeals were reviewed by an ALJ. In an initial decision, the ALJ
determined that Whiteway's multiple-message permit was improperly
revoked because the sign was reprogrammed as required within the oneyear period, and the applicable statutes and GDOT regulations did not
require that the sign display multiple messages during that time.
Furthermore, because the GDOTs definition of "multiple-message sign"
was evolving, the ALJ held that the GDOT's decision was not entitled to
the usual deference given to an agency's interpretation of a statute it is
required to enforce."
Finally, the ALJ decided that since Whiteway's multiple-message
permit was valid, Lamar's application was appropriately denied for being
too close in proximity to Whiteway's sign. Lamar sought agency review
by the GDOT, and the deputy commissioner reversed the AL's initial
decision.'"
The deputy commissioner determined that allowing
Whiteway to retain a permit for a multiple-message sign that was not
actually in use within the required time period may violate the Supreme
Court of the United States' "precedent by 'applying the more restrictive
regulatory scheme for a multiple message sign to a sign that is
indistinguishable from a static sign.'"o' Whiteway appealed the final
decision, and the superior court reversed, finding that Whiteway had
fully complied with all the permit requirements before the deadline.
Lamar then sought discretionary review of the superior court's judgment.102

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 495-96, 693 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 496, 693 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 496, 693 S.E.2d at 849-50.
Id. at 496, 693 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 496-97, 693 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 497, 693 S.E.2d at 850.
Id.
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In reviewing an administrative decision, the court of appeals first
determines whether there is sufficient evidence to support the agency's
findings of fact and then "examine[s] the soundness of the conclusions
of law [drawn from] the findings of fact."'" While the any evidence
rule is applicable to findings of fact, the court of appeals reviews
conclusions of law de novo."' In reviewing a superior court's order in
an administrative proceeding, the court of appeals does not "review
whether the record supports the superior court's decision but whether
the record supports the final decision of the administrative agency."o
Applying these established standards to this case, the court of appeals
determined the GDOT deputy commissioner's final decision did not
address the issues resolved by the ALJ in the initial decision and never
addressed whether Whiteway failed to make the required upgrades to
the sign in the one-year period.'" However, because the superior court
incorrectly reviewed the AL's decision, instead of reviewing the final
agency decision properly before the superior court for review, the court
of appeals remanded the case for reconsideration by the GDOT, whose
ruling will again be subject to superior court review."'o
The second case in this section also involved the two-step review
process for an administrative decision with a slight twist on the
standard of review applicable to the agency's findings of fact. In
Northeast Georgia Medical Center, Inc. v. Winder HMA, Inc.,'M the
court of appeals granted the two parties' applications for discretionary
appeal, and the cases were consolidated for review." Both Northeast
Georgia Medical Center (NGMC) and the Georgia Department of
Community Health (DCH) challenged the superior court's reversal of the
final decision of the State Health Planning Review Board (Board), which
awarded a certificate of need (CON) to NGMC for a 100-bed hospital.' The issue before the court of appeals was "whether the superior
court had a proper basis for reversing the agency's final decision." 1

103. Id. at 497-98,693 S.E.2d at 851 (alteration in orginal) (quoting Pruitt Corp. v. Ga.
Dep't of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 160, 664 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. Id. at 498, 693 S.E.2d at 851.
105. Id. (quoting City of LaGrange v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 296 Ga. App. 615, 616,
675 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 499, 693 S.E.2d at 851.
108. 303 Ga. App. 50, 693 S.E.2d 110 (2010).
109. Id. at 50, 693 S.E.2d at 111-12.
110. Id. at 50, 693 S.E.2d at 111.
111. Id. at 50-51, 693 S.E.2d at 112.
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In November 2006 NGMC applied to DCH for a CON for a new 100bed hospital that would replace a nearby facility."' Three months
later, Winder HMA, Inc.-d/b/a Barrow Regional Medical Center (Barrow
Regional)-a competing hospital in the area, opposed NGMC's application by alleging that NGMC was attempting to disguise a new facility as
a replacement facility, which "require[d] different calculations to
determine the need for a facility" under the DCH regulations.'1 " At a
meeting a few days later, the DCH informed NGMC that it did not
consider the proposed hospital to be a replacement facility, but it
acknowledged a need for an additional facility in the area and advised
NGMC to amend its request to seek the approval of a new hospital
instead of a replacement hospital."
In April 2007 NGMC submitted its amended application, which
Barrow Regional subsequently opposed. DCH, nevertheless, approved
NGMC's application and granted the requested CON. Barrow Regional
appealed DCH's decision, and following a full evidentiary hearing, the
hearing officer affirmed the issuance of the CON. Upon appeal to the
Board, the Board rejected Barrow Regional's assertions and adopted the
findings and conclusions of the hearing officer as its final decision. Next,
Barrow Regional appealed to the superior court, which reversed and
remanded the DCH's final decision for consideration as a new application instead of an amended application."'6 NGMC and the DCH then
appealed the superior court's decision to the court of appeals."e
Under section 50-13-30 of the Georgia Administrative Procedure
Act,"' the court of appeals had jurisdiction because the superior
court's decision terminated the proceedings regarding NGMC's original
Once jurisdiction was estabapplication and was a final decision."
lished, the court of appeals proceeded to discuss the proper two-step
standard of review for an administrative decision." 9 The court
explained that a court must first determine whether the evidence is
sufficient "to support the agency's findings of fact[,J and second, [a] court
[must]'examine[ the soundness of the conclusions of law [that are based
on those] findings of fact.'"" However, instead of applying the any
evidence standard to the first step, as the court of appeals did in Lamar,

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 51, 693 S.E.2d at 112.
Id.
Id. at 51-52, 693 S.E.2d at 112.
Id. at 52-53, 693 S.E.2d at 112-13.
See id. at 50, 693 S.E.2d at 111-12.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-20 (2009).
Ne. Ga. Med. Ctr., 303 Ga. App. at 53-54, 693 S.E.2d at 113-14.
Id. at 54, 693 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. (quoting PruittCorp., 284 Ga. at 160, 664 S.E.2d at 226).
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under the CON program governed by O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1,121 the court
applied a "substantial evidence" standard, which mandates that the
evidence "shall be in excess of the any evidence standard contained in
After applying this more stringent
other statutory provisions."'
standard to its review of the record, the court held that DCH's decision
was supported by substantial evidence.m
For the second step of the review, the court of appeals examined the
soundness of the DCH's conclusions of law based on its findings of fact,
stating that "the reviewing court must give deference to the agency's
interpretation of statutes it is charged with enforcing or administering
and to the agency's own rules and regulations."" The superior court
determined that the DCH acted arbitrarily or unlawfully by allowing
NGMC to amend its application instead of requiring it to file a new
application." However, the court explained that the applicable rules
and regulations adopted by the DCH provide that a determination of
whether an amendment constitutes a total change is within the DCH's
discretion." Giving appropriate deference to the DCH's interpretation
of the applicable rules, the court of appeals held that the DCH's
requirement that NGMC only file an amendment and not a new
application was not plainly erroneous.12 7 Accordingly, the court held
that the DCH had a rational basis to support its decision to grant
NGMC's application and reversed the superior court. 128
The next case examines in more detail the court of appeals jurisdictional limitation as to final actions of the superior court. In Coastal

MarshlandsProtection Committee v. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc.,129 the

consolidated appeal resulted from an order from the Superior Court of
Fulton County, Georgia, which reversed the AL's decision to affirm the
The
issuance of a dock permit to a developer, Mid-Roc, LLC.'
Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee (CMPC) issued the permit
pursuant to the Coastal Marshlands Protection Act of 1970,131 which

121. O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1 (2009).
122. Ne. Ga. Med. Ctr., 303 Ga. App. at 55,693 S.E.2d at 114 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also O.C.GA § 31-6-44.1(5).
123. Ne. Ga. Med. Ctr., 303 Ga. App. at 56, 693 S.E.2d at 115.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 57, 693 S.E.2d at 116.
126. Id. at 58, 693 S.E.2d at 116-17.
127. Id. at 60, 693 S.E.2d at 118.
128. Id.
129. 304 Ga. App. 1, 695 S.E.2d 273 (2010).
130. Id. at 1, 695 S.E.2d at 274.
131. O.C.GA §§ 12-5-280 to -297 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
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allows a developer to construct a dock over state-owned marshlands.' 32
Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. (ARK) appealed the CMPC's decision to an
ALJ, who affirmed the issuance of the permit. ARK then appealed the
AL's decision to the superior court, which reversed and remanded the
case back to the ALJ for rehearing. The CMPC, joined by intervening
banks that held an interest in the property, sought review of the
superior court's decision by the court of appeals.'3 3
Because the superior court's order was not final, the court of appeals
determined that it was not appealable." The superior court's remand
to the ALJ required further proceedings and reconsideration of the
matter under a different standard than the ALJ had previously
applied."' The court warned, however, that the "mere use of the word
'remand' does not automatically render the superior court's order
nonfinal and not appealable."3 Instead, each order must be evaluated
Overall, the court determined that it was
on a case-by-case basis.'
without jurisdiction to hear the appeals, and therefore, the appeals were
dismissed.s"
V.

OTHER STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS

The first case reviewed in this section, Longleaf Energy Associates,
LLC v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc.,'39 addresses a wide range
of administrative issues and errors and includes an important distinction
in the appropriate standard of review an AJ must apply when
1 o In Longleaf the appeal arose from a
reviewing an agency decision.x
Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia ruling that "invalidat[ed] an
air quality permit issued by the Environmental Protection Division
(EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources to Longleaf
Energy Associates, LLC" to allow the construction of a power plant."4
Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. and the Sierra Club challenged the
issuance of the permit, which the superior court subsequently invalidated. 4 2 The court of appeals reversed the superior court's ruling on

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

CMPC, 304 Ga. App. at 1-2, 695 S.E.2d at 274; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-5-286.
CMPC, 304 Ga. App. at 1-3, 695 S.E.2d at 274-75.
Id. at 4, 695 S.E.2d at 276.
Id. at 3, 695 S.E.2d at 276.
Id. at 3, 695 S.E.2d at 275.
See id. at 3, 695 S.E.2d at 275-76.
Id. at 4, 695 S.E.2d at 276.
298 Ga. App. 753, 681 S.E.2d 203 (2009).
See id.
Id. at 753-54, 681 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 754, 681 S.E.2d at 205.
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several grounds, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the superior
court with directions.'"
In discussing the reasoning behind its holding, the court of appeals
determined that the superior court had improperly ruled on three major
issues.'" First, the superior court improperly ruled that the permit
was required to include CO' emission limits." The court reasoned
that there was no evidence in the record of any Clean Air Act (CAA)'x
"provision or Georgia statute or regulation actually controlling] or
limit[ingi CO' emissions, and ... no federal or state court .. . orderling]
controls or limits on C02 emissions pursuant to the CAA."1
Second, the superior court improperly ruled that the CAA required the
EPD "to consider as part of its ... analysis whether the proposed power
plant should be required to use Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle
(IGCC) technology to minimize pollution."" The court of appeals held
that IGCC analysis was not required under the CAA and that to require
such an analysis was contrary to related court and administrative
decisions."
Third, the superior court improperly ruled that the EPD applied an
insufficient standard to the air quality modeling."s There was no
evidence that the Georgia standard applied by the EPD was arbitrary or
caprious."'5
In addition to recognizing these errors, the court of appeals further
determined the superior court incorrectly reversed the AI's rejection of
the challengers' amended counts for failing to comply with the pleading
requirements.'62 The court noted "that administrative review [is] not
Rather, administrative
designed to redo the permitting process."'
review is designed to allow for review of the initial permitting decision.x" Accordingly, the challengers carried the burden of "providling]
notice specific enough to enable a timely informed response from
opposing parties and a prompt ruling by the ALJ.""' The court of

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
See id. at 759-60, 764, 681 S.E.2d at 207, 209, 212.
Id. at 759-60, 681 S.E.2d at 209.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
Longleaf, 298 Ga. App. at 756, 681 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 760, 762, 681 S.E.2d at 209, 211.
Id. at 761, 692 S.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 764, 681 S.E.2d at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766, 681 S.E.2d at 213.
Id.
Id.
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appeals held that the challengers failed to meet the pleading requirements with respect to their asserted claims." Moreover, the court
held that the superior court erred by invalidating the permit based on
the fact that the EPD employees who set the applicable emission
standards were not registered engineers."' Because the issue was not
properly raised before the ALJ, the superior court did not have
jurisdiction to consider the issue.'"
Despite the long list of rulings the court of appeals found to be
erroneous, the court of appeals held the superior court correctly
determined "that the ALJ ... fail[ed] to apply the proper standard of
review, and ...

that the AL's final decision must be vacated."'s

Pursuant to the procedural rules governing the ALJ hearing, the hearing
was required to be reviewed de novo, and the ALJ was required to make
"an independent decision on whether the [cihallengers carried their
burden to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the permit
should not have been issued."" The AL's decision served as the final
decision of the EPD."'6 Accordingly, the AL's deference to the EPD's
decision was inconsistent with the required standard of review. 6 2
While such agency deference is the proper standard of review applied by
the courts when reviewing a final agency determination, such deference
is not afforded when the AL's review is the final decision of the
agency.'" The case was ultimately remanded "to the superior court
with directions that the AL's final decision be vacated, and that the
Court remand the case to the ALJ to consider the evidence under the
correct standard of review.' 6
The next case is revisited from last year's survey.'" In Sumter
Electric Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co.," the supreme court

granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-4(4)1'6 was erroneous.1' The factual issue in
the case centered around how territorial rights for electricity suppliers

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 766, 681 S.E.2d at 213-14.
Id. at 767, 681 S.E.2d at 214.
Id.
Id. at 770, 681 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 768, 681 S.E.2d at 215.
Id.
Id. at 769, 681 S.E.2d at 215.
Id.
Id. at 770, 681 S.E.2d at 216.
See Wilson & Blackburn, supra note 1, at 25-26.
286 Ga. 605, 690 S.E.2d 607 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 46-3-4(4) (2004).
Sumter Electric, 286 Ga. at 606, 690 S.E.2d at 608.
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are determined." The court of appeals applied only limited deference
to the Public Service Commission's (PSC) interpretation of the statute.o The supreme court agreed with the level of deference given,
determining that "[a]lthough the PSC's interpretation of an act is
entitled to great deference, this case does not involve interpretation of
a technical question necessary to the administration of a law. It simply
requires a judicial determination as to whether the PSC correctly
interpreted the plain meaning of the statute.""' Because the PSC did
not correctly interpret the plain meaning of the statute, the judgment of
the court of appeals was affirmed."' The newest member of the
supreme court, Justice Nahmias, noted in his concurrence that while the
parties spent a significant amount of time on corridor rights, the court
did not need to decide that issue because no such rights were ever
created for the electrical line.""a
The final case in this section, Georgia State Licensing Board for
Residential & General Contractors v. Allen," is a 4-3 split decision
from the supreme court involving the steadfast legal principle that
ignorance of the law is no defense. The Georgia State Licensing Board
for Residential and General Contractors (Board) appealed two orders
from the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia, in a suit brought
by over forty contractors, the plaintiffs, against the Board and the
Columbus-Muscogee County Consolidated Government (County) "seeking
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages in regard to a
statewide licensing system for residential and general contractors
(licensing law)."'
The discussion for this Article will focus on the
Board's challenge to the preliminary injunction granted to the plaintiffs
relating to the enforcement of the licensing law. 176
The Board licenses and regulates general and residential contractors
in Georgia."' Under Georgia law, "a valid residential or general
contractor license issued by the Board is required to lawfully engage in
the business of residential and general contracting within the state."7 e
Applicants must normally pass on examination and meet certain

169. See id. at 605-06, 690 S.E.2d at 607-08.
170. For a discussion of the court of appeals decision, see Wilson & Blackburn, supra
note 1, at 25-26.
171. Sumter Electric, 286 Ga. at 607, 690 S.E.2d at 608-09 (citation omitted).
172. Id. at 607, 690 S.E.2d at 609.
173. Id. at 608, 690 S.E.2d at 609 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
174. 286 Ga. 811, 692 S.E.2d 343 (2010).
175. Id. at 811-12, 692 S.E.2d at 344-45.
176. See id. at 812, 692 S.E.2d at 345.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a) (2008).
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requirements to obtain the license. 7 ' For an eighteen-month period,
the law allowed a contractor to apply for an exemption to the examination if the local government required a local license, and if the criteria
was "at least as strict and stringent, in the sole judgment of the [Bloard,
as those for the issuance of a corresponding state-wide license."'eo
Since the County had a local licensing requirement in place, the
plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to the state exemption and
that the County failed to give timely notice of the change in the licensing
law as required under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-14(b),' 8 ' thereby preventing
them from filing for the exemption prior to its expiration. Finding that
the harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the burden on the Board and the
County, the superior court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
the Board and the County from enforcing the licensing law pending a
final determination. The Board appealed the issuance of the preliminary

injunction.182
The supreme court determined that the plain language of O.C.G.A.

§ 43-41-14(b) requires notice of the licensing requirements and the
effective dates of the requirements but not the available exemptions.'s
Furthermore, the court noted that O.C.G.A. § 1-3-618 states, "'After
they take effect, the laws of this state are obligatory upon all the
inhabitants thereof. Ignorance of the law excuses no one.' Thus, under
this general statute, the plaintiffs were charged with notice of the
Morelicensing law, including the [expiration of the] exemption.""
over, injunctive relief is only appropriate when it is needed to preserve
the status quo until the final adjudication of a case.'" The preliminary injunction oppressed the rights of the County, the Board, and the
citizens of Georgia by enjoining the licensing law from safeguarding the
public against unqualified residential and general contractors.' 8 7 The
preliminary injunction was unnecessary because the plaintiffs still had
a remedy available to them if they successfully challenged the licensing

179. Allen, 286 Ga. at 813, 692 S.E.2d at 345.
180. Id. at 812-14, 692 S.E.2d at 345-46 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(cX2XA) (2008).
181. O.C.G.A. § 43-41-14(b) (2008).
182. Allen, 286 Ga. at 814-16, 692 S.E.2d at 346-48.
183. Id. at 817, 692 S.E.2d at 348.
184. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-6 (2000).
185. Allen, 286 Ga. at 817, 692 S.E.2d at 348 (citation omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 1-36.
186. Allen, 286 Ga. at 818, 692 S.E.2d at 349.
187. Id.
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law-they could seek monetary damages for any work lost due to the
licensing law during the applicable time period."e
The dissent, written by Justice Benham and joined by Justices Carley
and Thompson, adamantly disagreed with the majority's reversal of the
Prior to the enactment of the state's
preliminary injunction."
licensing law, contractors such as the plaintiffs were only required to
obtain a local license in Muscogee County. There was no notice given by
the County as to the change in this policy or the expiration of the
available exemption. Many of the plaintiffs testified at the preliminary
injunction hearing that they were not aware of the exemption and that
it therefore did not apply." Furthermore, the Board did not make a
decision as to whether the County's local licensing requirements were
"substantially similar to the state examination" until after the expiration
of the exemption."e1 Accordingly, the plaintiffs were no longer able to
apply for the exemption following the determination by the Board that
the County's local license met the statutory requirements.'" Because
the facts of the case did not reflect an abuse of discretion as to the
issuance of the preliminary injunction, the dissent would have upheld
the superior court's order.1'
VI. 2010 LEGISLATION
Having little or no funds to work with because of a revenue shortfall,
but realizing that 2010 was a re-election year, the General Assembly
made an unexpectedly high number of changes in the realm of administrative agencies. The highlights were as follows:
1. There is now a Georgia Halls of Fame Authority Overview
Committee, which takes over the role of the Georgia Music Hall of
Fame Authority Overview Committee, with a combination of
oversight for the Georgia Music Hall of Fame Authority and the
Georgia Sports Hall of Fame Authority."*
2. The Georgia Golf Hall of Fame Authority and the Georgia
Golf Hall of Fame are gone."es

188. Id.
189. Id. at 819, 692 S.E.2d at 349 (Benham, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 820, 692 S.E.2d at 350.
191. Id. at 821, 692 S.E.2d at 350-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. at 821, 692 S.E.2d at 351.
193. Id.
194. Ga. S. Bill 523, § 3, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 331,334 (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 123-550 to -554 (2006 & Supp. 2010)) (amending O.C.GA. §§ 12-3-550 to -553 (2006)).
195. Ga. S. Bill 449, § 1, 3, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 753, 754 (repealing O.C.G.A.
§§ 12-3-580 to -592 (2006), and O.C.G.A. §§ 50-12-64 to -69.1 (2009)).
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3. The Georgia Agrirama Development Authority has been
abolished, with the Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia inheriting the State Museum of Agriculture. 19
4. There is now a Joint Committee on Water Supply comprised of
legislators to implement and oversee the expansive legislation on
water matters enacted in 2010.m9
5. Advanced geography lives on with the establishment of the
Georgia Geospatial Advisory Council."'
6. There is now a Georgia Foundation for Public Education.1'
7. The State Ethics Commission has become the Georgia
Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission.'
8. The General Assembly created a 2010 Special Council on Tax
Reform and Fairness for Georgians and a Special Joint Committee on
Georgia Revenue Structure.201
9. The Department of Transportation has a new statutorily
created division known as the Intermodal Division. 2
10. The Georgia Workforce Investment Board and the Governor's
Office of Workforce Development have been established.'
11. The Department of Public Safety has a brand new statutory
division known as the Capitol Police Division.2 0 4
12. The Georgia Athlete Agent Regulatory Commission is abolished.205

196. Ga. H.R. Bill 1090, §§ 1, 2, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 135, 136 (codified at
O.C.G.A. §§ 12-3-651(c), 12-3-662 (Supp. 2010)) (amending O.C.G.A § 12-3-651(2006) and
enacting O.C.G.A. § 12-3-662 (Supp. 2010)).
197. Ga. S. Bill 370, § 10, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 732, 744 (not codified in the
O.C.G.A.). Note that the committee expires at the end of 2010. Id.
198. Ga. H.R. Bill 169, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 96 (codified at O.C.GA. § 12-5-9
(Supp. 2010)).
199. Ga. S. Bill 427, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 411 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-2-14.1
(Supp. 2010)).
200. Ga. S. Bill 17, §§ 2, 3, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1173, 1174, 1178 (codified at
O.C.G.A. §§ 21-5-3, -4 (Supp. 2010)).
201. Ga. H.R. Bill 1405, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 729 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 28-12-1
to -4 (Supp. 2010)).
202. Ga. S. Bill 305, § 1, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 396 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 32-2-41
(Supp. 2010)).
203. Ga. H.R. Bill 1195, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 84 (codified at O.C.G.A. H§ 34-14-1
to -4 (Supp. 2010)).
204. Ga. H.R. Bill 1074, § 1, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 137, 137 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§§ 35-2-120 to -124 (Supp. 2010)).
205. Ga. S. Bill 149, § 2, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 376, 383 (codified at O.C.G.A. ch.
43-4A (Supp. 2010)).
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13. The Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority has undergone a name change and is now the Georgia Environmental Finance
Authority.2
14. The Georgia Class Nine Fire Department Pension Fund has
been repealed, and all of its functions have been transferred to the
Georgia Firefighters' Pension Fund.20
15. The Employees' Retirement System of Georgia will no longer
provide oversight for the Employees' Social Security Coverage
Group.' That function has shifted to the State Personnel Administration.2m
16. There is now a Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and
Human Services Transportation,2 o along with a Transit Governance
Study Commission.1" Both of these groups are part of advances
made in comprehensive legislation regarding transportation in our
state.
17. For the first time since the 1960s, Georgia will have a State
Treasurer. The Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services has now been
renamed as the Office of the State Treasurer, and its director receives
the new title. 2
18. In order to facilitate coordinated actions among governments,
there is now a Commission on Regional Planning."'

206. Ga. H.R. Bill 244, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 949, 950 (codified in scattered
sections of the O.C.G.A.); see also Ga. H.R. Bill 320, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 197
(codified at O.C.G.A. § 47-2-318 (2010)).
207. Ga. H.R. Bill 1150, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 438 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 47, ch.
7 (2010)).
208. Ga. H.R. Bill 997, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1248 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 47, ch.
18 (2010)).
209. Id. at §§ 1, 7, 2010 Ga. Laws at 1248, 1252.
210. Ga. H.R. Bill 277, § 4, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 778, 784 (codified at O.C.G.A.
*§32-12-1 to -6 (Supp. 2010)).
211. Id. at § 7, 2010 Ga. Laws at 803 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-32-5 (Supp. 2010)).
212. Ga. S. Bill 296, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 863 (codified in scattered sections of the
O.C.GA). Georgia Senate Bill 296 is primarily codified in O.C.GA tit. 50, ch. 5A (2010).
Id. at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 863.
213. Ga. H.R. Bill 867, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 468 (codified at O.C.G.A. §0 50-8-50
to -52 (Supp. 2010)).

